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least enfranchised among them and threatens to unseat those occupying the precarious perch called tenure.
But can the academy, through a series of measures either mild or draconian, significantly alter its slide into proletarianization? I shall argue here that it cannot: the academic jobs crisis is embedded in the contradictions of a profit-directed and competitive global economic system that requires such harsh rationalization; and while this trend must be fought, the crisis it signals is essentially not soluble-and here I use a phrase that will surely reveal my political stance-"under capitalism." Two recent books by Cary Nelson-Manifesto of a Tenured Radical, a compilation of his own essays about the "culture wars" and now the "job wars," and Will Teach for Food: Academic Labor in Crisis, an anthology addressing the Yale strike in particular and the jobs crisis more generally-ably document and analyze many features of the current attack on higher education. Even as they purport to take up the cause of working-class students and those who aspire to teach them, however, these books exhibit considerable blindness to the class function that higher education has always served, and continues to serve, in the United States-with or without the presumably enlightening impact of the "new knowledges" of the past couple of decades. Nelson's two volumes thus alert us to the inadequacy of liberal homilies about universities and suggest the necessity for going beyond the limits of reformismpiecemeal or otherwise-as we devise strategies for addressing the current crisis.
The facts are stark. At least 45 percent of all faculty in higher education are part-timers, as compared with 34 percent in 1980 and 22 percent in 1970. In community colleges, 65 percent of all classes are taught by non-tenure-track faculty. While the salaries of tenured faculty have stagnated, the gap between them and the marginalized mass has widened, with tenure-track faculty on average earning close to $12,000 for teaching a course for which a teaching assistant is paid slightly over $2,500 and a part-timer often as little as $1,500. Although Ph.D. candidates in English now often take eight to ten years to complete their degrees and pile up tens of thousands of dollars in debt, the number of tenure-track jobs shrinks steadily. Linda Ray Pratt, past president of the AAUP and chair of an AAUP committee on the status of non-tenure-track faculty, estimates that "if things continue unchecked, about 90 percent of the English Ph.D.'s on the market in the next few years will not find a tenure-track job" (Will Teach 265).
As the essays in the first half of Manifesto remind us, Nelson comes to the jobs wars of the 1990s as a veteran of the culture wars of the 1980s: his proud claim to be a "tenured radical" is a swipe at Roger Kimball's neoconservative diatribe about the presumed ruination of the academy by unreconstructed 1960s leftists. A fine scholar who has done yeoman's work in reconfiguring U.S. modernism to include not only women and people of color but also leftist writers "disappeared" by anticommunism, Nelson perspicaciously notes that "debates over political correctness have made cutting university budgets a great deal easier. A delegitimated university is easier to defund" (Manifesto 108). The devilish wit informing his potshots at conservative cultural warriors like William Bennett, Lynne Cheney, and Dinesh D'Souza becomes more harshly satirical as, in the second half of Manifesto, Nelson contemplates the ethical bankruptcy of a profession that "eats its young." The Yale faculty who blackball their striking TAs teach only a third of the undergraduate courses, "delivering their wisdom like pigeons roosting high above in the ivy" (200). Job-seekers who persist in thrusting themselves on the job market year after year are viewed as "damaged goods" by prospective purchasers of their labor (159)-or, in a striking metaphor, "lepers in the acropolis-a distraction, a betrayal, a burden, a mirror that offers us an image of ourselves we do not want to see" (174). Nelson unabashedly names names, detailing the strike-breaking activities of a gaggle of Yale professors, from traditional literature scholars such as Annabel Patterson, Margaret Homans, and Peter Brooks to would-be progressives such as postcolonial critic Sara Suleri, women's history scholar Nancy Cott, and slavery historian David Brion Davis. Yale professor David Bromwich, reacting to Nelson's support of the graduate student union (GESO), looks "like a vampire bat suddenly exposed to a shaft of sunlight" (141). Repudiating the ideology of professionalism that would bind him to conspiratorial silence, Nelson narrates specific examples of reprehensible institutional behavior, such as a UC-Santa Cruz English Department job search calling upon hundreds of graduate students to spend thousands of dollars xeroxing and express-mailing writing samples that the hiring committee never even read. Nelson cuts through the selfjustifying language of bureaucracy, reminding us that every budgetary act carries moral-or immoral-consequences. He castigates administrators obsessed with the bottom line, but he reserves his most thundering j'accuse for idiot savant tenured academics determined to engage in the narcissistic reproduction of themselves by maintaining Ph.D. programs even when these programs' graduates face disappearing opportunities for tenure-track employment.
Nelson is the first and most vocal tenured faculty member to get up on the stepladder and sound his barbaric yawp about the increasing gap between the haves and the have-nots in the academy; we should all be grateful for his boldness and honesty. Nelson's insistence upon viewing structural issues in ethical terms is intimately related to his stubborn adherence to various discourses that-as I shall argue more fully below-shore up the very system of exploitation that he detests. In arguing that higher education will be irreparably harmed by its search for the cheapest labor, he invokes the national interest: "quality will decline and we will no longer compete ... effectively [in the global environment]" (Manifesto 8). In celebrating the canon-busting movement of the past twenty years, he invokes the rhetoric of patriotism: canon revision is "a triumph of democracy" (191), and "multiracial intellectual work" is "something the country desperately needs" (96). Above all, despite the mass of evidence he cites to the contrary, Nelson evinces an abiding faith in the university as a neutral site of enlightenment and seconds the impassioned plea of a Yale graduate student: "We have a right to ask for this university to be the thing that we believe it should be" (Will Teach 26). Nelson thus sees a schizophrenic break between the university's presumed production of emancipatory knowledges on the one hand and its exploitative behavior as an employer on the other: "democracy is fulfilled in scholarship and betrayed in the workplace" (Manifesto 3). And although he exhibits a profound antipathy to the effects of "corporatization" upon higher education, his very use of the term implies the existence of a golden age in which universities did not serve the interests of ruling elites. Nelson's reformist agenda-set forth in a twelve-step program at the end of Manifesto-is thus limited from the outset by the ideological assumptions, voiced as nostalgia, that guide it. If only we could get back to the good old dayswith curriculum expanded, needless to say, and faculty and student body diversified-the job wars would end, and peace and prosperity would return to the groves of academe. through "long-distance learning," threatens to do away with the traditional classroom for large numbers of college students. Alone among the contributors to Will Teach for Food, Schrecker seems to appreciate the extent to which colleges and universities as we now know them may not simply be downsized, but actually disappear, as the search for the cheapest possible teaching labor is taken to its logical conclusion.
The most ambitious essay in Will Teach for Food is Stanley Aronowitz's "Academic Unionism and the Future of Higher Education." Examining the different roles played by the different branches of higher education-the "multiversity"-in the U.S. economy since World War II, Aronowitz points out their various functions as "knowledge factories." The first-tier research campuses provide sites whereby the state "socializes the costs of research" for business; the second-tier universities and colleges "transmit the knowledge produced in research universities" and "impart the Western intellectual and moral tradition to students"; the community colleges "provide technicians to business and industry" and function "ideological[ly]" to offer "the promise of higher education for all" (188-89). Implicit in this "subordination of research to practical ends" and this "selling of American universities as sources of cultural capital" was a threat to the humanities, which "as concept survive only in the first tier of elite universities" (194-96). Since the imposition of fiscal austerity in the later 1980s, however, there has occurred in these "knowledge factories" a "decisive power shift from faculty to administration," with the "intellectual mission of the academic system now exist Ehrenreich's statement epitomizes the pitfalls of an ethical approach to questions of structural inequality. Her moral stance, like Nelson's, arises from admirable egalitarian impulses. Yet it also rests upon an epistemologically reductionist stereotype of the Marxist approach to higher education's social function: the view that universities reproduce ruling-class hegemony through the formation of consciousness and indeed agency becomes, in her rendering, the crudely reflectionist doctrine that universities simply "mirror ... what's going on in the country" and, without mediation, "produce the bandit chieftains who will carry on the work of further enriching the already rich without conscience or remorse." Ehrenreich's outrage is thus largely a function of her rejection of a materialist outlook and her denial of the class nature of the capitalist university. In asking whether the university might not be indeed part and parcel of the "bandit economy," and doing the "right thing" in training its students to reproduce oppressive social relations, it is as if she has peered into the abyss. In crying out that Yale should "set an ethical example for the rest of the world," it is as if she cannot accept the bottomless depths she saw and has pulled back to familiar terrainonly then to lament the impossibility of acting upon the "ought" that seems to her so self-evident, but which the Yale Corporation clearly does not hear. Like the Yale protester who quixotically affirms the "right" to demand that Yale "be the thing that we believe it should be," Ehrenreich diverts her analysis from the principal "moral" issue-namely, whether a socioeconomic system that "grinds down" its workers and "keep[s] them slaves to economic anxiety" "ought" to be allowed to exist in the first place.
But while a stubborn liberal faith in the mission of the university contributes crucially to the myopia guiding many of the commentaries on the crisis in academic labor under discussion here, this faith is itself the product of larger historical determinations. For liberalism, with its penchant for construing problems in moralistic terms and offering piecemeal and technical solutions, never exists in isolation from other political tendencies. Indeed, at various times-such as the 1960s, as Czitron reminds us-it has been significantly on the defensive. Whether or not liberal ideas exercise dominance thus depends in large part upon the overall ideological configuration of a given place and moment. Although Nelson and others celebrate the emancipatory effects of the canon-revision and theory movements of the past two decades and rue a perceived contradiction between the new scholarship and the backwardness of many of its practitioners, I would suggest that the new scholarship has not only failed to arm academics adequately to deal with the current crisis but has in fact contributed to their idiot savant stance. For while Nelson insists upon distinguishing the "happy-family multiculturalism" tolerated by Cheney from the tougher type that he practices, the primary legacy of the canon-busting movement has been, through a rhetoric of "inclusion," "diversity," and "contributions," to strengthen U.S. capitalism by promoting transclass conceptions of nationalism and democracy. Those of us who have participated in this movementand have retooled our own teaching and thinking in the processshould be under no illusions that, in the absence of anticapitalist critique, we have done anything to dispel our students' illusions about the fundamentally oppressive nature of U.S. social relations or the role of universities in sustaining those relations. Indeed, we may have augmented those illusions by promoting an identity politics completely assimilable to patriotic "patchwork quilt" notions of U.S. civil society. That Nelson considers "multiracial intellectual work" to be "something the country desperately needs," and that he faults academic downsizing for making it harder for U.S. workers to "compete . . . effectively in the global environment," indicates the extent to which a presumably progressive multiculturalismembodied in the "mission" of the "democratic university"-is assimilable to a consummately unoppositional nationalism.
Moreover, a bedrock premise of postmodern theory-featured explicitly in early attacks on logocentricity, seeping into the premises of self-consciously political and historical criticism, and now permeating the ground water of even apparently nontheoretical cultural commentary-is that totalizing schemes of all kinds, but Marxism in particular, have for once and for all been discredited. The particular is the site of analysis and the local is the site of change; not class unity but alliance of disparate self-articulating groups is the premise of action; and not revolution but reform (or simply "subversion") constitutes the horizon of the possible, which is itself construed not as a classless society but as "utopia." Nelson may posit a disconnection between the meaning of recent scholarship and the behavior of its practitioners, but I for one see no insurmountable contradiction between the postcolonial theory and the strike-breaking practice of a Sara Suleri. Nelson may express consternation that "we" have won the culture wars only to be beaten back in the jobs wars. But in my view this "we"-like all "we's"-requires scrutiny, as does the notion of "winning." For if a "we" wholly assimilable to the ideological needs of U.S. capitalism won the culture wars only by relegating Marxism almost completely to the margins, this was a Pyrrhic victory. Indeed, we might wonder whether it was a victory at all: pace the rantings of the radical right, might not the (presently) secure hegemony in the academy of feminism, multiculturalism, and postmodernism (as well as of recent movements from "post-" to "trans-") represent the broadest range of elite interests? Disarticulating one "war" from the other, it seems to me, only encourages a mechanical categorization of winners and losers. If a "we" articulating the needs of workers are to win some skirmishes in the jobs wars, and in whatever other wars lie ahead, a major revision of paradigms-to use the favored Maoist term, a "self-criticism"-is needed.
Clearly I do not have the space here to offer an analysis of the academic labor crisis from the standpoint of Marxist "totality." But various lines of analysis-suggested in part by Nelson, Aronowitz, and others but not fully pursued-seem particularly worth developing. To begin with, it is crucial to view the current crisis in academic labor in the U.S.-manifested in downsizing, cost-cutting, and other strategies of "corporatization"-in the largest possible frameworknamely, the international capitalist economy. This requires understanding the impact upon universities of various developments commonly entailed by that mantra term "globalization": the development of a world market in labor, resulting in increasing competition for jobs-both skilled and unskilled-between U.S. workers and their counterparts overseas; consequent pressures on U.S. college students to view the humanities as a luxury and to pursue careers in business or technology, where they believe the grass is greener; the increasing positioning of humanities departments as "service" departments, simultaneously stressing the delivery of writing skills (narrowly conceived) and undervaluing the labor of the teachers providing those skills. In short, the increasing reliance upon a "reserve army" of marginalized and grossly underpaid aca-demic laborers-especially in the humanities-is inseparable from larger shifts in the global division of labor.
If we bring in globalization, however, two provisos are in order. First, to propose that the position of U.S. workers in the international labor market has shifted along with global movements of capital is not necessarily to endorse the argument (embraced by the Gingriches and Reichs alike) that the U.S. has simply to meet new "human capital" needs-that as soon as the U.S. working class is extensively retooled to work in high technology, we can all dance happily across that bridge into the twenty-first century. For even though the New York Times occasionally carries articles about the shortage of highly trained computer technicians, it also routinely reports on the latest tens of thousands laid off by AT&T and Kodak. Key-punch operations are exported from New York to Haiti; computer-related technology is the number one industry in India, which neoliberalism has effectively incorporated into global labor markets. The main effect of globalization on U.S. labor, then, has been to drive down its value; and its main effect on U.S. education has been to drive down the value of a college degree and to exacerbate the divisions among the various educational tiers Aronowitz describes. As early as 1973-when the postwar boom was coming to an end, and a future of intensified international competition and falling levels of profit was visible to those who make it their business to study these things-the Committee on Economic Development, at the bidding of the Trilateral Commission, came out with a report calling for a reorientation in the nation's conception of higher education. The growth of universities in the postwar period had produced a "crisis in democracy," concluded the CED Report. An overeducated working class was entertaining unrealistic expectations for advancement; it was necessary either to restrict access to higher education or to diminish the value of a college degree. The budget-cutting that has produced the shortage of academic jobsor, more accurately, of tenure-track jobs-is thus inseparable from a deliberate government policy of decredentialization and wage reduction-presided over by Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conser-vatives alike, we should note-that has gained impetus over the past quarter-century of increased global competition.
Second, in considerations of globalization it is crucial to view cap- Rather than facing a future in which the old metropoles band together to superexploit the periphery, we are facing a "new world disorder" characterized by spiraling capitalist competition and dissension and, sooner than we care to think, the threat of large-scale war. In a paradox more apparent than real, the postmodernist revulsion against totality when it comes to class analysis within the U.S. coexists with an embrace of supertotality when it comes to considerations of globalization-entailing, in both cases, an inability to appreciate the role of exploitation in both establishing and destabilizing social relations. What are the implications of this analysis of globalization for the situation of academic labor in the U.S.? Nelson and various contributors to Will Teach for Food view the current trend toward downsizing and proletarianization in the academy as remediable, if brutal, because they see "corporatization" as, finally, willed. The philistinism of Republican-dominated state legislatures bent upon defunding universities they view as hotbeds of feminism, multiculturalism, and relativistic deconstruction; the short-sightedness of campus administrators modeling their cost-cutting measures on those practiced in corporate America, and sacrificing the quality of higher education in the process; the greed of corporations unwilling to pay the tax bill that would make ample funds available to the public sector: these are, presumably, the root causes of the crisis in academic labor. But if we view the crisis in the context of increasing international competition and falling rates of profit, we reach quite a different conclusionnamely, that cutbacks in funding for higher education, like the shredding of the safety net and other attacks on the working class's "social wage," are caused not primarily by stupidity or right-wing animus or greed (though these doubtless enter in) but by necessity. The Yale Corporation, it is true, no doubt possesses the funds to pay its campus workers, including graduate students, some multiples of what it pays them now. But the corporations that many of the Yale trustees help direct, and upon which they model their cost-cutting at Yale, do not enjoy this option-not if they are to remain internationally competitive. Nor do they have the option to pay the higher tax bill that would more generously fund the public sector-not if they are to remain internationally competitive.
From the above considerations, two main trends emerge as possibilities for the future of employment in U.S. higher education. On the one hand, its institutions may remain recognizable-albeit with an expansion of vocational education in community colleges, a restriction of access to downsized four-year colleges, and, among teachers throughout the system, a hardening of divisions between the haves and have-nots along the tenure-line. The upside of this first scenario, from the point of view of capital, is that, for students and teachers alike, it retains some of the social-control functions served by higher education-even if equal opportunity and class mobility appear increasingly as mirages on an ever-receding horizon. The downside, however, is that, even with the continued devaluation of tenured professors' salaries that would surely accompany this trend, it would still carry a significant price tag.
On the other hand, the second scenario-which Schrecker foresees, and which Nelson too predicts in his grimmer moments-is that higher education would be cut back across the board, and that all but the most elite private and flagship public campuses would turn into sites for vocational training, dispensed by a "flexible" teaching staff-cyber, video, or corporeal-for whom the tenure system is a distant memory, and for whose students movement into the "middle class" has ceased to function even as myth. This scenario, epitomized in the nightmare vision of a "Drive-Through U," has in fact been validated in recent prophetic pieces in the New York Times and Business Week-hardly organs specializing in idle visionmaking-as well as in recent proposals by New York mayor Rudolph Giuliani that the city's public community colleges institute entrance examinations that would effectively reduce enrollments by some 75 percent. The upside of this second strategy, from the perspective of capital, is that it enforces labor discipline, produces fewer workers with unfulfillable expectations of advancement, and shaves labor costs to a minimum; the downside is that sooner or later it is bound to produce a massive crisis of popular confidence and precipitate those upheavals from below that the New York Times euphemistically refers to-in other countries-as "social unrest." Although the first scenario is, in the short run, perhaps more benign for those faculty who manage to hold on to tenured jobs, both scenarios are in the long run disastrous for the great majority of academic workers (not to mention students). Both are, moreover, compatible with an increasingly fascistic turn in U.S. society-in which, as in a dystopian work of science fiction, the elites breathe pure air in the ethereal realms while the policed masses labor like ants and scavenge their living in the urban rubble. Neither scenario rules out the other, however, either synchronically or diachronically; and although the drift of the MLA's CPE report is that the profession should accommodate itself to the first in order to offset the second, there is clearly no guarantee that adopting such a strategy would do anything other than buy a little time for the more privileged-or, more accurately, for the less underprivileged. In any event, both scenarios are, or ought to be, unacceptable to all who work or learn on college campuses-except for maybe a few Yale professors, the truly "blessed of the earth," who go to their graves priding themselves in their membership in the Yale Corporation. And both scenarios indicate the woeful inadequacy of current dike-plugging proposals such as unionizing faculty and graduate students and converting parttime adjunct positions to full-time. We have-to alter the metaphor-descended much too far down the slippery slope for such reformist measures even to begin to address the crisis.
I opened by naming the 1998 MLA Convention as the historical occasion prompting these meditations. In closing, let me alter the tone of what has perhaps seemed an unremittingly dour commentary by noting that, despite the appearance of uninhibited power on the part of those who impose upon us one or another regime of austerity, they do so out of weakness rather than strength, constraint rather than choice. They can carry out their "regime of educational disaccumulation," therefore, only so long as our weakness remains greater than theirs. But even as the CPE was offering its prescription for mass academic suicide at the 1998 MLA Convention, the Radical Caucus was-in its modest way-definitively moving leftward, determining that academics friendly to the left can no longer engage in self-censorship about radical-that is, revolutionary-solutions to the present crisis. For too long-as the books under review here indicate-the discourse of progressives and leftists has been limited to the domain of piecemeal liberal reformism, validated by the implicitly anticommunist premises of a willfully anti-totalizing postmodernism. Yet the clearly systemic nature of the attack upon academic laborers-and our students-is forcing, for many, the realization that the capitalist social order cannot deliver upon its promises to the vast majority of people. Of course there is much to debate about what has derailed various movements for classless societies in our century; the MLA Radical Caucus, hardly the center for world revolution, cannot pretend to be a primary agent for change. But it can and will provide a forum in which contemplation of what in the 1930s used to be called "the way out" will not be ruled out of court, and in which attempts to contest inequities in the here and now will
